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BIANNUAL SURVEY
logically, therefore, that if a claim asserted in an original pleading
can give notice, certainly a defense can do likewise and enable the
avoidance of the bar of the statute of limitations.
ARTICLE 3-JURISDICTION AND SERvIcE, APPEARANCE AND
CHOICE OF COURT
Expansion of jurisdiction under CPLR 302 does not broaden
the "doing business" concept.
The fact that the federal constitution permits a state to
exercise in personam jurisdiction over a foreign defendant under
the "minimum contacts" 20 theory does not compel the state to
expand its concept of "doing business." 21 Subsequent to the case of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,2 2 while it was clear that
the New York Legislature could expand jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants, due to legislative inactivity, the courts were
confined solely to the "doing business" test until CPLR 302 was
enacted.23  Since the effective date of the CPLR, a foreign cor-
poration, although not "doing business," will be held in personam
if it is "transacting business" provided, however, that the cause
of action arises out of that business."4 Considerably less is re-
quired for "transacting business" than is required by the "doing
business" test. It must be noted, however, that the "doing business"
test has not been altered, and if CPLR 302 is inapplicable to a
case, the non-resident defendant must be "present" in order to be
held in personam.25  To be "present" is to be "doing business.
26
20McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
21 Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 440-41 (1952);
see Fremay, Inc. v. Modern Plastic Mach. Corp., 15 App. Div. 2d 235, 239,
222 N.Y.S.2d 694, 699 (1st Dep't 1961); Ames v. Senco Prods., Inc., 1 App.
Div. 2d 658, 146 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1st Dep't 1955).22 Supra note 20.
23 Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 285-86, 200 N.E.2d
427, 429-30, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433, 436-37 (1964).
24 CPLR 302(a): "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any
non-domiciliary . . . as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts
enumerated in this section . . . if, in person or through an agent, he:
1. transacts any business within the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state . . . or
3. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the
state."
25 See Simonson v. International Bank, supra note 23, at 286-87, 200
N.E.2d at 430, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 437-38.
26 "[I]f it [the defendant] is here, not occasionally or casually, but with
a fair measure of permanence and continuity, then . . . it is within the
jurisdiction of our courts . .." Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y.
259, 267, 115 N.E. 915, 917 (1917).
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The minimum contacts theory enunciated in the leading
Supreme Court cases does not stand for the proposition that a
state may exercise in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant indiscriminately on the ground that defendant has had
contact with the state at some time or another. Rather, it is
contended that International Shoe stands for the proposition that
"solicitation plus" is enough only in so far as the obligation arises
out of that activity. The exercise of the privilege of conducting
activities within the state "may give rise to obligations, and, so
far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the
activities within the state," 27 the defendant may be held in personam
without any violation of due process. It is within this limited area
of activity that CPLR 302 has its effect.
The recent case of Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline2s is an
illustration of the fact that the "doing business" (presence) test
has not been altered in New York by the broadening of jurisdiction
under the "longarm" statute (CPLR 302). In that case, plaintiff,
a New York resident, was injured at an airport in Paris, France,
allegedly as the result of defendant's negligence. The defendant,
Finnair, was a corporation organized under the laws of Finland
and not registered in the United States. Service was made upon
the manager of Finnair's New York office. This office was staffed
by three full time and four part time employees, none of whom
was an officer of Finnair. All of defendant's flights originated
and terminated outside the United States. The New York
office sold no tickets, nor could it bind defendant by contract.
Finnair's New York office maintained a bank account which
averaged less than $2,000 and was used primarily to pay salaries
and rent. Aside from advertising and publicity work, it appeared
that the principal function of the New York office was to
receive from travel agencies reservations for travel on Finnair in
Europe. This information was transmitted thereafter to the
defendant in Europe. The court reaffirmed the "presence" test
holding that these activities were incidental and that they did not
constitute "doing business" in New York.29  The court stated
that CPLR 302 did not apply because the cause of action did not
originate from the business transacted in New York.
CPLR 302(a) (1): The "transaction of business."
CPLR 302(a)(1) requires a relationship between the trans-
action and the cause of action in order to be effective. Two recent
cases demonstrate the need for this relationship.
27 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra note 20, at 319; see
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
2822 App. Div. 2d 16, 253 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1st Dep't 1964).29 1d. at 22, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 221-22.
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